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ABSTRACT
A learning federation is composed of multiple participants who use
the federated learning technique to collaboratively train a machine
learning model without directly revealing the local data. Neverthe-
less, the existing federated learning frameworks have a serious de-
fect that even a participant is revoked, its data are still remembered
by the trained model. In a company-level cooperation, allowing the
remaining companies to use a trained model that contains the mem-
ories from a revoked company is obviously unacceptable, because
it can lead to a big conflict of interest. Therefore, we emphatically
discuss the participant revocation problem of federated learning
and design a revocable federated random forest (RF) framework,
RevFRF, to further illustrate the concept of revocable federated
learning. In RevFRF, we first define the security problems to be
resolved by a revocable federated RF. Then, a suite of homomorphic
encryption based secure protocols are designed for federated RF
construction, prediction and revocation. Through theoretical anal-
ysis and experiments, we show that the protocols can securely and
efficiently implement collaborative training of an RF and ensure
that the memories of a revoked participant in the trained RF are
securely removed.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Federated learning (FL) is a novel collaborative learning framework
proposed by Google [20]. As shown in Fig. 1, its main idea is to
build a machine learning model with the sub-updates derived from
distributed datasets, which accelerates model training speed and
avoids direct privacy leakage. Benefited from the artful design, FL
attracts increasing interest among scholars and is widely applied
to all kinds of application scenarios, such as speech recognition
[21], e-health [7] and especially, mobile networks [4]. Moreover,
as the data reconstruction attack towards the sub-updates is dis-
covered [12], scholars also put a consistent concern to enhance the
privacy-preserving strategy in FL [3, 4]. Commonly, the core of the
privacy-enhancing frameworks is using the cryptographic tools
(e.g., homomorphic encryption [9]) to implement secure aggrega-
tion of sub-updates, which can greatly increase the hardness of
launching the data reconstruction attack [31].
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However, all the existing frameworks are based on a default
assumption that a participant never leaves from the federation or
only temporarily loses connection. This means once a participant
is involved in a federation and has ever uploaded a sub-update,
its “trace” will be permanently remained in the trained model, as
shown in Fig. 1. Recent researchs [8, 24, 28] points out that the
“trace” can leave a chance for the adversary to infer a participant’s
data, even though the participant has been revoked from the learn-
ing federation. Naturally, such a kind of privacy leakage is unfair
and unacceptable for a revoked participant. Furthermore, in a real-
world setting, the defect can leave many potential pitfalls. A typical
example is the cooperation of multiple companies (e.g., hospitals
mentioned in [7]) based on the FL technique. If one of the compa-
nies ends the cooperation with others, the subsequent usage of the
information derived from its business data in the learning federa-
tion is obliviously illegal. This kind of dispute can greatly hinder
the further development of FL.
Cloud Server
Learning Federation
Sub-Update
Service
Federated Learning Participants
Cloud Server
Federated Learning Participants
Participant 
Revocation Why my data 
is still used?
Figure 1: A defect of existing FL frameworks
Inspired by the above discussion and the basic FL framework,
we think that a benchmarking learning federation should satisfy
the following security requirements.
• Collaboration Privacy. The original data of a participant can-
not be directly or indirectly revealed to others, especially in
the gradient aggregation process.
• Usage Privacy. The machine learning model built by the FL
technique is sometimes treated as a publicly-available “in-
frastructure” of the learning federation. Therefore, there are
two security requirements for usage privacy: 1) ensuring that
no original data are revealed in the usage stage; 2) protecting
the privacy of usage request content.
• Revocation Privacy. The revoked participant has the right to
choose whether to leave its contributed data in the learning
federation or not. If the choice is “no”, the data of the revoked
participant should be neither available for the remaining
participants nor remembered by the trained model.
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Up to now, most FL frameworks can achieve the collaboration
privacy [4, 21, 21], and some of them also consider the second goal
[15, 17] Nevertheless, none of them defines or resolves the potential
problems brought by participant revocation. Therefore, we intro-
duce the revocable FL concept in this paper and propose RevFRF,
a revocable federated random forest (RF) framework to further il-
lustrate the concept. RevFRF achieves federated RF construction
and prediction with the homomorphic encryption technique, and
meanwhile, supports secure participant revocation. Besides the
high popularity, the reason for choosing RF as our target model is
that compared with the other models, like the neural network, the
tree structure of RF is more intuitive to state the revocation privacy
problem of FL. Our contributions in this paper are as follows.
(1) Revocable Federated Learning. RevFRF extends the prac-
ticality of FL in real-world scenarios by introducing the re-
vocation concept. To more intuitively illustrate the concept
of revocable federate learning, RevFRF further defines a re-
vocable and efficient federated RF framework.
(2) Secure RFConstruction. Based on FL, RevFRF implements
RF construction without direct local data revealing. Different
from the traditional privacy-preserving RF schemes, the tree
nodes of RF in RevFRF are from different participants and
encrypted with different public keys, which is the basis of
realizing the participant revocation security.
(3) Secure RF Prediction. Based on the homomorphic encryp-
tion technique, RevFRF ensures that RF prediction can be
completed without revealing any information about the pre-
diction request and the RDT nodes, which well meets the
security requirements for usage privacy.
(4) Secure Participant Revocation. Based on a specially de-
signed participant revocation protocol, RevFRF implements
two levels of revocation. For the first-level, we ensure that
the data of an “honest” revoked participant are securely re-
moved from the learning federation. For the second-level, we
further ensure that even a revoked participant is corrupted,
its data are still unavailable for the adversary.
(5) LowPerformance Loss andHigh Efficiency.We conduct
experiments to prove that RevFRF only causes less than 1%
performance loss during RF construction, and costs about 3
seconds to construct an RDT (faster about 1000 times than
existing privacy-preserving RF frameworks).
Outline. In Section 2, we discuss the related work and background
of RevFRF. In Section 3, we define the system and security models
of RevFRF. In Section 4, we describe the cryptographic tools used
in RevFRF. In Section 5, the implementation details of RevFRF are
presented. Section 6 proves the security of RevFRF in a curious-
but-honest model. Followed by the comprehensive experiment in
Section 7, the last section concludes this paper.
2 RELATEDWORK AND BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly review the related work and background
knowledge of federated learning and random forest (RF).
2.1 Federated Learning
Federated learning (FL) is a decentralized machine learning frame-
work that is originally designed to achieve collaborative learning
with mobile users [20]. For FL, one of the biggest advantage is that
the attack surface is limited to the device layer, which dramatically
reduces the risk of privacy leakage. Recent work of Bonawitz et al.
[3] claimed that they have successfully applied the FL technique
over tens of millions of real-world devices and anticipated billion-
level uses in the future. Moreover, besides the deep neural network
(DNN) applied in the original framework [20], FL is also extended
to other machine learning models, such as support vector machine
(SVM) [27], long short term memory network (LSTM) [21] and
extreme gradient boosting forest (XGBoost) [17].
Furthermore, the original FL is designed without any protection
of cryptographic tools [20]. The later researches [12, 31] pointed out
that the naive design of FL is no longer secure with the existence of
dishonest participants. Thus, some cryptographic tools are added in
FL against these attacks [4, 11, 21]. Bonawitz et al. [4] utilized the
secret sharing technique (SS) to complete the secure aggregation
of the secretly shared sub-updates. However, the most significant
problem of SS is that it is vulnerable to the collusion attack [35].
Mcmahan et al. [21] proposed a federated language recognition
model with the differential privacy technique (DP). For DP, it is a
quite difficult task to balance the trade-off between performance
loss and efficiency [13]. Additionally, Hardy et al. [11] designed
a private FL framework towards the vertically partitioned data
with homomorphic encryption (HE). Compared with the other two
cryptographic tools, HE is thought to have less performance loss
and be more robust to the collusion attack [34].
2.2 Random Forest
RF is an ensemble machine learning model that contains multiple
random decision trees (RDTs) trained by the bagging method [10].
In this paper, we use RF to give a benchmark of revocable FL. For
RF training, the most important operation is the leaf expansion
[10]. There are two parts to specify a leaf expansion method, which
are candidate split recommendation and candidate split quality
assessment. In RevFRF, these two parts are completed based on the
RF framework proposed in [10], which outperforms the standard
RF framework.
As one of the most widely applied machine learning models, how
to implement privacy-preserving RF has been a research hotspot.
In 2013, Vaidya et al. [29] proposed a HE based framework that im-
plements both privacy-preserving RF construction and prediction.
Followed by Vaidya’s work, Ma et al. [19] designed a high-accurate
privacy-preserving RF framework for the outsourced disease pre-
dictor. The traditional HE based frameworks have a common de-
fect that they encrypt the whole database in the RF construction
stage, which is inefficient. Rana et al. [23] used the DP technique
to implement a more efficient privacy-preserving RF framework.
Nonetheless, as discussed before, the DP technique usually intro-
duces obvious performance loss. Moreover, there are also some
privacy-preserving RF frameworks [5, 32] which are only designed
for prediction and not enough for practical use.
3 SYSTEM MODEL OF REVFRF
In this section, we give the design motivation of RevFRF and define
its system model and security model.
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3.1 motivation
ID Age Sex Marriage
1 23 male no
2 42 female yes
3 18 female no
4 27 male yes
5 33 female yes
ID Work Class Education Occupation
1 Private Bachelor Sales
2 Local Gov. Doctorate Tech-support
3 Never Worked Prof-School Unemployed
4 Without-Pay Bachelor Other-service
5 Monthly-Pay Prof-School Worker
ID Bill PaymentFrequency of Shopping
1 4647 4
2 75773 15
3 135 8
4 434 6
5 3478 10
Normal Participants
Company A
Company B
Company C
Company D
Center Server
A Revocable RF with 
Encypted Nodes
Labels
Each RDT node is revocable 
and corresponding to one 
dimension of feature, like 
Age > 20?
ID Given Credit Income > 5K?
1 2000 yes
2 100000 yes
3 1000 no
4 1000 no
5 8000 yes
① 
② 
Federated RF 
Construction
Figure 2: A real-world application scenario of FL (predicting
whether a customer’s monthly income is more than 5K)
Our research is mainly motivated by a real-world application
scenario of FL, shown in Fig. 2, which is a company-level cooper-
ation. Different from the user-level cooperation presented in the
original FL framework [20], the data shared in the company-level
cooperation has considerable commercial values. Therefore, once a
company ends the cooperation with others, it cannot want its data
to be still used by other companies. To more clearly state the prob-
lem, RF is obviously the best choice among the massive machine
learning models because of its intuitive tree structure. As shown
in Fig. 2, the “memory” of an RF is directly reflected in the form
of RDT node. To let a participant be able to securely quit from a
learning federation, the most intuitive method is to delete the parts
(RDT nodes) of the model influenced by the revoked participant
and ensure the deleted parts no longer available for the remain-
ing participants. The first goal is easy to implement. Nevertheless,
to achieve the second goal, we must resort to the cryptographic
tool. Consequently, we introduce a modified Distributed Two Trap-
doors Public-Key Cryptosystem (DT-PKC, defined in Section 4) [6]
in federated RL and propose a benchmark of federated RF frame-
work, RevFRF. Since DT-PKC supports homomorphic encryption
across different domains, RevFRF ensures that the RDT node that
is encrypted with its provider’s key can still be computable for
RF prediction, and also, easily removed from an RF. The details of
RevFRF are presented in Section 5.
3.2 System Model
As shown in Fig. 3, RevFRF comprises four kinds of entities, namely
a center server (CS), a set of normal participants (UD), a computa-
tion service provider (CC) and a key generation center (KGC). The
data in RevFRF is vertically partitioned, as illustrated in Fig. 2
Center Server. CS is usually an initiator of a learning federation
of RevFRF. It takes on most of the computation tasks in RevFRF
and manages the usage of the trained RF model. Specially, CS is
also a data provider who has the ground truths, i.e., the labels for
classification or the prediction target for regression.
Normal Participant. RevFRF involves more than one normal
participants, UD = {u1,u2, ..., }. Each ui ∈ UD has one or more
dimensions of data used for RF construction.
Computation Service Provider.CC is responsible for assisting
CS to complete the complex computations of HE.
Normal Participants
Center Server
Computer Service 
Provider
Key Generation 
Center
Encrypted Data
Label Data
Feature Data
HE Keys
Sub-Update
Service
Figure 3: The system model of RevFRF
Key Generation Center. KGC is only tasked with key genera-
tion and distribution.
3.3 Adversary Model
In RevFRF, KGC is a trusted party. A trusted party always hon-
estly completes its task and does not collude with anyone else. CS,
UD and CC are curious-but-honest, which means they follow the
promised steps of our protocols but also want to benefit themselves
by learning other parties’ data. Therefore, we introduce a curious-
but-honest adversary A. A is restricted from compromising both
CS and CC but can corrupt any subset of UD. For the corrupted
participants, A obtains their local data and private keys. In the RF
construction and predication stages, the goal of A is using the ob-
tained knowledge to derive the private data of “honest” participants.
The private data include the original feature data and the candidate
splits, because . Specially, in the participant revocation stage, we
define two levels of revocation strategies. For the first-level revoca-
tion, A is restricted from colluding with the revoked participant.
We call the security implemented by the first-level revocation as
“forward” security. For the second-level revocation, A is released
from the restriction. Correspondingly, the security implemented
by the second-level revocation is called “backward” security. In the
two levels of revocation, the goals of A are identical, which are
deriving the private data of ‘honest” participants and operating the
old RF without the revoked participant. Different from the former
two stages, A has an additional goal in this stage. This is because
RevFRF has to rebuild the RF after a participant is revoked. If the
old RF is available, the revocation naturally becomes meaningless.
4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOOLS
The security of RevFRF is mainly provided by HE. RevFRF intro-
duces the DT-PKC for operating homomorphic encryption. Table 1
summarizes the frequently-used notations of HE. Three types of
keys are generated in a DT-PKC, namely public key, weak private
key and strong private key. The public key is used for encryption.
The weak key and the strong private key are used for partial decryp-
tion and full decryption in RevFRF, respectively. Their generation
process is as follows.
Given a security parameter k and two arbitrary large prime
numbers p, q, we first derive another two numbers p′ = (p − 1)/2
and q′ = (q − 1)/2, where the data lengths of p and q are both k .
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Table 1: Notation Table
Notations Descriptions
pku , sku A pair of public-private keys for HE.
λ1, λ2 Randomly split strong private keys for HE.
[[m]]pku A ciphertext encrypted with pku using HE.
| · | The size of an arbitrary set.
| | · | | The data length of an arbitrary variable.
κ The security parameter.
p,q p and q are two big primes, | |p | | = | |q | | = κ.
N N is a big integer satisfying N = pq.
ZN An integer field of N .
Then, we compute a generator д = −a2N of order (p − 1)(q − 1)/2,
where a ∈ ZN 2 is a random number. Finally, a weak private key
sk is randomly selected from [1,N /4] and its corresponding public
key is computed by pk = (N ,д,h = дsk ). The strong private key
is λ = lcm(p − 1,q − 1), where lcm(·) is a function to compute
the lowest common multiple. In RevFRF, λ is randomly split into
λ = λ1 + λ2. λ1 and λ2 are distributed to CS and CC, respectively.
There are five DT-PKC based functions [16] involved in RevFRF,
including encryption (HoEnc), re-encryption (HReEnc), ciphertext
refresh (HEncRef), partial decryption (ParHDec1 and ParHDec2)
and comparison (HoLT). Their detailed implementations are pre-
sented in Appendix A.2.
(1) Encryption. Given a plaintext messagem and a public key
pku1 , HoEnc(pku1 ,m) outputs a ciphertext [[m]]pku1 .
(2) Re-Encryption. Given a ciphertext [[m]]pku1 , u2 can use
pku2 to compute HReEnc(pku2 , [[m]]pku1 ) and output a re-
encrypted ciphertext [[m]]pkΣ , where pkΣ = pku1 + pku2 .
(3) CiphertextRefresh.Given a ciphertext [[m]]pku1 ,HEncRef(r ,[[m]]pku1 ) refreshes the ciphertext without changing the
plaintext, where r is randomly chosen from ZN .
(4) Partial Decryption. Partial decryption contains two steps.
Given a ciphertext [[m]]pkΣ , ParHDec1 (sku1 , [[m]]pkΣ ) outputs
a partially decrypted result [[m]]pku2 ; ParHDec2(sku2 , [[m]]pku2 )
outputs the plaintext messagem.
(5) Comparison.Given two ciphertexts [[m1]]pku1 and [[m2]]pku2 ,
u3 uses HoLT([[m1]]pku1 , [[m2]]pku2 ) to output an encrypted
result [[l]]pkΣ , where pkΣ can be pku3 + pku2 or pku3 + pku1 .
Ifm1 is less thanm2, l is 1; otherwise, l is 0.
In these functions, the plaintext is withinZN and the ciphertext is
within ZN 2 . The areas [0,R1) and (N −R1,N ] are used to represent
the positive and negative numbers, respectively, where | |R1 | | <
| |N | |/4. Specially, the numbers need to be encrypted can be not
integers. To resolve the problem, we use the fixed-point format to
represent these numbers. For brevity, the detailed discussion about
the data format is given in Appendix A.1.
5 REVFRF FRAMEWORK
In this section, we first overview the workflow of RevFRF, and then,
present its implementation details. Notably, for easy understanding
of readers, we suppose that one participant only has one dimension
of feature data in this section.
5.1 RevFRF Overview
As shown in Fig. 4, RevFRF contains three stages, namely secure
RF construction, secure RF prediction and secure participant revo-
cation. A brief overview of these stages are given below.
CCKGC CS UD
Set up keys for HE 
Send a random feature 
selection vector
Return the data split 
vector of candidate splits
 Ask for the 
encrypted best split
Upload the best split 
encrypted with HE
Iterative 
Tree 
Growth 
Federated RF 
Construction
Send a prediction request 
encrypted with HE
Conduct HoLT to traverse the RDTs in RF
Return the results encrypted with HE
Results encrypted with HE
Partially decrypted results
Iterative 
Tree 
Traversal
Federated RF 
Prediction
Return the 
prediction result
Send a revocation 
request 
Delete the nodes uploaded 
by the revoked participant 
and rebuild the RDTs
Secure 
Participant 
Revocation
HoEnc
HoEnc
ParHDec1 ParHDec2
Figure 4: High-level overview of RevFRF
Secure RF Construction. RevFRF constructs an RF in two steps.
1. Key Setup. KGC generates the HE keys and distributes them
to all participants.
2. Federated Tree Growth. To avoid the private data of participants
revealed to others, the tree growth in RevFRF is implemented by
iteratively invoking a specially designed leaf expansion protocol.
In the protocol, CS first randomly chooses a subset of all features.
Then, the normal participants that own the data of chosen features
recommend candidate splits in a random range. The candidate splits
are not directly sent to CS but sent in split vector format (equal
to the gradient in DNN [20]) to avoid privacy leakage. Finally, CS
asks the participant who provides the split vector with the highest
quality to upload the encrypted best split. The encrypted best split
is stored as a new RDT node in the fixed-pointed format (defined
in Appendix A.1).
Secure RF Prediction. Secure RF prediction is used to securely
process a prediction request. The request is not vertically parti-
tioned and contains all dimensions of features. Such a request type
is commonly discussed in the privacy-preserving RF frameworks
[5, 29, 32]. The processing procedures of a prediction request are
given below. First, the requester sends the encrypted prediction
request to CS. Then, CS iteratively traverses the RF with a secure
RF prediction protocol. Finally, CS computes the prediction result
according to the task type and returns it to the requester.
Secure Participant Revocation. Secure participant revocation
guarantees that the data of revoked participants are removed from
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Protocol 1 Federated Leaf Expansion (FLE-Expan)
Input: A sample selection vector ®µ; a randomly selected subset F ′ of the feature set F ; the task type task ∈ {0, 1}; current tree depth dc .
Output: A random decision tree T .
1: if dc > dmax or F ′ is empty then
2: return A random decision tree T .
3: end if
4: CS generates a feature selection vector ®v = (v1,v2, ...,v |F |). If feature i belongs to both F ′ and F , vi = 1; otherwise, vi = 0.
5: CS distributes the sample selection vector ®µ and the feature selection vector ®v to each u ∈ UD.
6: for uτ ∈ UD and vτ ∈ ®v is 1 do
7: Choose the selected samples D ′τ based on ®µ.
8: Uniformly and randomly select ϱ samples from the selected samples, i.e., D ′′τ = {xτ ,1,xτ ,2, ...,xτ ,ϱ } and D ′′τ ⊂ D ′τ .
9: Compute xmin = arg minxτ ,k ∈D′′τ xτ ,k and xmax = arg maxxτ ,k ∈D′′τ xτ ,k .
10: Averagely pick ς candidate splits S = {s1, s2, ..., sς } in the interval [xmin ,xmax ].
11: Towards each candidate split sı ∈ S, initialize a split vector ®wı = (wı,1,wı,2, ...,wı, |Dτ |). For the unselected sample xτ , ȷ < D ′′τ ,wı, ȷ
is set to 0. For xτ , ȷ ≤ sı , setwı, ȷ = −1, otherwise,wı, ȷ = 1. In this way, uτ can generate a selection setWτ = { ®w1, ®w1, ..., ®wς }.
12: end for
13: For each each participant uτ ∈ UD, CS collectsWτ and constructsW = {W1,W2, ...,W|UD | , }.
14: CS removes the feature corresponding to sp from F ′, adds (split , ®u, ®w0,dc ,u0,σ0,F ′) =POS-Find(W, task) into current tree, updates
dc = dc + 1, invokes FLE-Expan(Sign( ®w0),F ′, task,dc ) and FLE-Expan(Sign(− ®w0),F ′, task,dc ) to generate two child nodes.
the RF and no longer available for remaining participants. When a
normal participant wants to quit a learning federation, CS first tra-
verses the RDTs in the trained RF and destroys the splits provided
by the participant. Then, the protocol used for RF construction is
invoked to rebuild the destroyed RDT nodes. In most cases, these
steps are enough to provide “forward” security of participant revo-
cation. This is because the RDT nodes in RevFRF are always kept
in encrypted format and can only be used with the existence of
their providers. If we suppose the revoked participant is “honest”,
the above steps have been able to ensure the revoked data to be
unavailable for the subsequent use of the old RF. Nonetheless, con-
sider the situation where the adversary corrupts the participant
after it is revoked. The above revocation is no longer secure from
the “backward” perspective. By colluding with CS and the revoked
participant, the adversary can operate the old RF without being
noticed by the other “honest” participants. Therefore, we further
provide a second-level revocation to ensure “backward” security.
Compared to the first-level revocation, extra computations are in-
volved in the second-level revocation to refresh the revoked splits
with random values. By this way, we ensure that the revoked splits
are no longer available even for its provider.
5.2 Secure RF Construction
RevFRF mainly uses two secure protocols for RF construction,
namely the federated leaf expansion protocol (FLE-Expan) and the
federated optimal split finding protocol (FOS-Find). The two proto-
cols allow the participants of RevFRF to collaboratively construct
an RF without directly uploading their local data. The following is
the implementation details of secure RF construction.
Key Setup. Before constructing the RDTs of RF, KGC first initial-
izes the cryptographic keys. The key distribution can be completed
offline or by secure channels.
Federated Tree Growth. In RevFRF, CS grows a RDT by itera-
tively invoking FLE-Expan. Every time FLE-Expan is completed, a
RDT node is expanded in current RDT. To grow a RDT with depth
dmax , FLE-Expan has to be operated at most
∑dmax
i=0 2
i times. Two
parts specify the RF construction process.
Sample 
Selection
Randomly Choose 
A Sample Subset
D D Recommend 
Candidate Splits
S Split 
Vectors
W Upload 
to CS
Figure 5: The workflow of leaf expansion.
One is the recommendation of candidate splits (Protocol 1, line
4-18). Its workflow is as illustrated in Fig. 5. CS first randomly
selects a feature subset F ′ ⊂ F and builds a feature selection
vector ®v corresponding to the selected features. The size of F ′ is
usually recommended to be
√|F | [2]. Then, the selection vector
is distributed to all participants. Each participant checks whether
its feature is selected. If selected, the participant uτ confirms the
involved samples of current node, D ′τ , through a sample selection
vector ®µ. Each dimension of ®µ corresponds to a training sample
and is initially set to 1. Next, CS randomly picks out a subset of the
involved samples, D ′′τ , and determines its minimum value xmin and
maximum value xmax . The candidate splits S are averagely chosen
between xmin and xmax . Corresponding to each candidate split,
uτ computes a 0-1 split vector, ®wi . Finally, the set of split vectors
W = { ®w1, ®w2, ...} is sent it to CS for split quality assessment.
The other is the assessment of candidate split quality (Protocol 2).
Based onW, CS completes the assessment by invoking FOS-Find.
During the assessment, we introduce the following sign function.
siдn(x) =
{
1, if x > 0
0, if x ≤ 0 . (1)
CS inputs each element of ®w ∈ W into Sign(·). If the output is
1, the sample corresponding to the element is added in the left
child, otherwise, it is added in the right child. Towards different
tasks, the quality of a candidate split is assessed in different ways.
For regression, CS computes the mean squared errors (MSE) by
E(D1,D2, ®w). For classification, CS computes the Gini coefficients
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Protocol 2 Federated Optimal Split Finding (FOS-Find)
Input: The split vector setW; the task type task ∈ {0, 1};
Output: An optimal RDT node.
1: For each ®w ∈ W, CS splits its local data set by computing
D1 =Sign( ®w) × D and D2 =Sign(− ®w) × D.
2: if task is 0 then # regression task
3: ®w0 = arg min ®w ∈W E(D1,D2, ®w).
4: else # classification task
5: ®w0 = arg min ®w ∈W G(D1,D2, ®w).
6: end if
7: CS asks the participant u0 that provides ®w0 to upload the cor-
responding split s0.
8: u0 encrypts sp = [[s0]]pk0 =HoEnc(pk0, s0), and sends [[s0]]pk0
to CS.
9: return the optimal split sp .
by G(D1,D2, ®w). The computation methods of the two functions
are given in Appendix B. Among all candidate splits, the one with
the lowest MSE or Gini coefficient is chosen as the optimal split
of the current node. And CS asks the participant that provides
the optimal split to upload it in encrypted format. FLE-Expan is
iteratively invoked until reaching the maximum tree depth dmax .
5.3 Secure RF Prediction
In RevFRF, a participant can use the constructed RF by invoking
the federated prediction protocol (FRF-Predict and FT-Predict).
The requester u0 encrypts his request with his public key and
sends it to CS. As received the encrypted request, CS repeatedly
operates FT-Predict to get the prediction result ri of each RDT.
The procedure of FT-Predict is as follows. At the beginning of
the root node of treeTi , CS extracts the encrypted split [[sτ ]]uτ and
its corresponding provider u0. By invoking HoLT, CS can obtain the
comparison result l between the feature value in the request and
the split. The comparison result is encrypted with both the public
keys of uτ and CS. Therefore, both uτ and CS are necessary to
obtain the plaintext comparison result (Protocol 5, line 8-9). Finally,
if the decrypted comparison result l is 1, CS enters the left child
node; otherwise, enters the right child node. Notably, in this process,
the 0-1 output is revealed to CS. The revealing of 0-1 output does
not influence the security RevFRF, because it tells nothing but the
relation between RDT node and the request are both encrypted.
According to [16], the information is not enough to derive the
plaintext data. The above operations are repeated until reaching a
leaf node. As all RDTs are traversed, CS computes the final outputO
and returns it to the requester. The final output has two types. For
regression,O is a mean value of each RDT output. For classification,
O is the category with the most votes among all RDTs.
Sometimes, RevFRF also has to process the vertically partitioned
data for model testing during RF construction. The processing of
the prediction for testing is similar to the above steps except that
the comparison operations during the RF traversal can be locally
completed by each participant. Therefore, we do not discuss this
type of prediction in details and only present its implementation in
Appendix D ( Protocol 6 and Protocol 7).
5.4 Secure Participant Revocation
RevFRF implements participant revocation with the secure par-
ticipant revocation protocol (FRF-Revoc, Protocol 3). FRF-Revoc
provides two levels of participant revocation. For the first-level
revocation, we guarantee that the data of the revoked participant
are no longer available by the remaining participants, and the RF
is securely rebuilt after the revocation. If the revoked participant
is “honest”, such level of revocation is secure enough. However, if
both CS and the revoked participant are corrupted, the revocation
becomes insecure. According to our assumption, the adversary can
obtain and copy the data stored in a corrupted CS, which means
that simply asking CS to destroy the data of the revoked participant
is meaningless. With the copied data and the corrupted private key
of the revoked participant, the adversary can totally operate the old
RF model with remaining “honest” participants. This is because the
“honest” participant only partially decrypts the messages received
in the RF prediction stage, and cannot identify whether the running
RF is old or not. Therefore, we further propose the second-level
revocation to ensure that the data about the revoked participants
are not available even by their provider to avoid the “backward”
attack. The revocation process is as shown in Fig. 6 and given below.
Normal Participants UD1 Normal Participants UD2
Revoked 
Participant
A Simple Example of Participant Revocation
Revocation 
of Nodes
RDT 
Rebuild
RDT Node Provided by 
The Revoked Participant
Reconstructed RDT Node 
with Remaining Participants
Figure 6: A simple example of participant revocation with
one RDT
The revoked participant sends a revocation request to CS. As
long as the request is received, CS first checks whether the signature
is valid. If the revocation request is valid, CS iteratively traverse all
RDTs in current RF. During the traversal, the RDT node provided
by ur and all its child nodes are removed from the RF. Then, the
removed RDT nodes are rebuilt by invoking FLE-Expan. ur does
not participate in the rebuilding process. In worst condition (the
revoked node is the root node), CS has to reconstruct a whole RDT.
Theoretically, the probability of the worst condition is only 1|UD | .
Hence, in most cases, the remaining participants can rebuild the
federation at a few extra costs. Moreover, since the RDTs in an
RF are isolated from each other, the rebuilding of one RDT does
not influence the function of other RDTs. If we do not consider
the “backward” security, CS publishes the revocation information
as soon as the above iterative steps are completed. Considering
the “backward” security, we still have to do the following computa-
tions to implement the second-level revocation. While destroying
the revoked RDT nodes, CS sends the revoked splits to CC. CC
refreshes the ciphertexts of the splits by computing HEncRefresh.
The refreshed splits are returned to CS and refreshed again. Here,
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Protocol 3 Secure Participant Revocation (FRF-Revoc)
Input: The revoked participant ur ; the original random forest T = {T1,T2, ...}
Output: A rebuilt random forest T ′.
1: ur sends a revocation request reqr to CS.
2: CS computes Verf(kver,ur ,σr ). If the result is not 1, reject the request; otherwise, do the following steps.
3: for Ti ∈ T do
4: For each Nodej ∈ Ti that is not rebuilt, do the following computations.
5: CS extracts the provider uj of Nodej .
6: if uj is the revoked participant then
7: CS traverses the child nodes of Nodej until reaching the leaf node. All these child nodes and Nodej are destroyed from Ti .
8: To rebuild the destroyed nodes, CS invokes FLE-Expan(®u,F ′, task,dc ). The inputs of FLE-Expan are previously stored in Nodej
(Protocol 1, line 14).
9: For second-level revocation, CS still has to do the following three additional steps:
10: CS sends the revocation request reqr and the destroyed splits of the revoked the nodes to CC.
11: CC generates a random value rd for each destroyed node Noded and compute HEncRef(rd , sd ), where sd is the split of Noded . All
the refreshed nodes are returned to CS.
12: CS also generates a random value r ′d for each destroyed node Noded and computes HEncRef(r ′d , sd ).
13: end if
14: end for
15: CS forwards the revocation request to KGC, and KGC revokes the keys of ur .
16: CS publishes the message that ur is removed from the learning federation to every other participant.
the revoked splits are refreshed for two times. By this way, the splits
are encrypted with a public key of its provider and two random
keys generated by CS or CC. Since CS or CC cannot be simulta-
neously corrupted, we guarantee that the refreshed splits are no
longer available for the adversary.
Another considerable problem for participant revocation is that
the missing of dimensions of data may reduce the effectiveness of
the trained model. A commonly accepted idea is that most features
in a dataset are redundant and there is still no way to perfectly
eliminate the redundancy [30]. Thus, it is reasonable to think that
the lack of a small number of dimensions cannot obliviously the
usability of a dataset. The experiment results in Section 7 further
prove the correctness of our thinking (Table 2 and Table 3). Conse-
quently, the revocation of only a few participants does not influence
the effectiveness of RevFRF in most cases.
5.5 Further Discussion
Three important security and application problems of RevFRF are
further discussed below.
Selection VectorsWe say that the 0-1 vectors in the RF construc-
tion stage do not reveal any information about the participant’s
private data. For the feature selection vector ®v , it is randomly gen-
erated to select a subset of features. Therefore, it does not relate to
any participant’s private data. Then, the sample selection vector
®µ reflects the sample partition result with the newly obtained best
split. The best split is related to a single dimension of data and the
data is only known by its provider. Thus, ®µ reveals nothing but the
fact that the provider has several secret values and some of them
are less than others, which is not enough to derive the original data.
The same explanation can also be used to state that the split vector
®wı ∈ Wτ does not reveal any private data of uτ .
Dimension Extension. The above implementation is based on an
ideal condition where each u ∈ UD owns one dimension of feature
data. However, in most cases, a participant usually has multiple
dimensions of data. To adapt to this condition, we only have to
make a few simple modifications to Protocol 1. First, each u ∈ UD
checks more than one dimension of the feature selection vector
(Protocol 1, line 7). Then, for all selected features, u completes the
computations of candidate split recommendation (Protocol 1, line
8 13). Thus, RevFRF can handle the multi-dimensions condition and
achieve the same performance as before.
Model Extension. In RevFRF, we choose RF as a benchmark. In-
deed, other federated learningmodels, like CNN andDNN, also have
the same requirement. The difference is that for RF, the sub-updates
of model training is the candidate splits, while for neural network,
the sub-updates are gradients. The core idea of extending our revo-
cable federated learning concept is derived from the parameter up-
date principle of CNN and DNN, i.e., ωK = ω0 − η∑Ki=1∑Uij=1 njnb дj ,
whereωK is a parameter after K iterations, η is the learning rate,Ui
is the involved participants for ith iteration, nb is the batch size, дj
the average gradient of nj training samples owned by participant j .
To implement revocable federated learning, we just have to let each
participant encrypt дj and use HoAdd to complete the summing
operation. HoAdd is a secure HE addition algorithm across different
domains, given in Appendix A.2. Nevertheless, compared with the
intuitive tree structure of RF, the structure of the neural network is
too abstract. Therefore, we think RF is more ideal to illustrate our
revocable federated learning concept.
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove that RevFRF is secure under the curious-
but-honest model.
6.1 Security of Cryptographic Tools
To prove RevFRF security, we first have to state the security of the
utilized cryptographic tools.
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6.1.1 Key Security. The DT-PKC has two types of trapdoors, weak
private key and strong private key. The weak private key is securely
stored by each participant but the strong private key is randomly
split and distributed to CS and CC, respectively. The security of
strong private key split is based on the information-theoretic secure
secret sharing framework proposed by Shamir [26]. In RevFRF, the
key split satisfies λ1 + λ2 ≡ 0 mod λ and λ1 + λ2 ≡ 1 mod N 2. λ1
and λ2 are two random shares of the strong private key λ. According
to the (2, 2)-Shamir secret sharing framework [26], any less than
two shares cannot recover the shared value. Therefore, nomatter CS
or CC is compromised by the active adversary (other participants
have no knowledge about λ), λ cannot be revealed, which is the
following theorem [16].
Lemma 6.1. The strong private key split described in Section 4 is
derived to be secure from the (2, 2)-Shamir secret sharing under the
honest-but-curious model.
6.1.2 DT-PKC Security. DT-PKC has been proved to be semanti-
cally secure in the standard model, which is based on the hardness
of DDH assumption over ZN 2 [6]. For brevity, we only give the
following lemmas and omit its proof.
Lemma 6.2. The DT-PKC is semantically secure based on the as-
sumed intractability of the DDH assumption over ZN 2 , which also
derives that the DT-PKC based functions HoEnc, HReEnc, HEncRef,
ParHDec1, ParHDec2 and HoLT are secure.
6.2 Security of RevFRF
We define the security of our protocols based on a universal com-
position framework (UC) [22]. According to UC, we assume all par-
ticipants honestly execute a protocol and there is an environment
machine called Env . For honest participants, their inputs are chosen
from Env and their outputs are returned to Env . Without loss of
generality, the curious-but-honest adversary A can also interact
with Env . Nevertheless,A only simply forwards all received proto-
cols messages and acts as instructed by Env . For a real interaction
of an arbitrary protocol π , we let Real(π ,A,Env) to represent the
view of A. Similarly, Ideal(π , ξ ,Env) is used to represent the ideal
view of A when we let Env interact with a simulator ξ and honest
participants. Based on the above assumptions, a formal definition
of protocol security is derived as follows [22].
Definition 6.3. A protocol π of RevFRF is secure in the curious-
but-honest model if there exist simulators ξ = {ξCS , ξCC , ξUD } that
can simulate Ideal(π , ξ ,Env) which is computationally indistin-
guishable from the real view Real(π ,A,Env) of honest-but-curious
adversaries A = {ACS ,ACC ,AUD }.
Definition 6.3 is the basis of our security proofs of RevFRF. Ac-
cording to the definition, we prove that an adversary cannot obtain
more knowledge from received protocol messages than a suite
of meaningless random values. In addition, we suppose there is
a trusted functionality machine Ft that can correctly conduct all
computations involved in RevFRF, such as random value generation
and HE encryption.
Secure RFConstruction. In this stage, two protocols are involved,
i.e., π = {FLE-Expan,FOS-Find}. Since the two protocols are not
independent from each other, we regard them as one protocol in the
security analysis. We use the following two theorems to show that
there exist two independent simulators ξUD , ξCS that can generate
computationally indistinguishable views for π . Since CC does not
participate in the computation of secure RF construction, it is trivial
to analyse ξCC .
Theorem 6.4. For secure RF construction, there exists a PPT simu-
lator ξUD that can simulate an ideal view which is computationally
indistinguishable from the real view of AUD .
proof. Consider the scenario that a subset of UD is corrupted.
For the corrupted participants, ξUD controls their local data and
outputs. Therefore, ξUD can simply follow the steps of π with the
local data. On behalf of the honest participants of UD, ξUD runs
AUD and uses dummy values to simulate its view. Specifically,
the message that a participant u ∈ UD sends to CS can only be a
split vector set Wτ or the best split encrypted with HoEnc. ξUD
can simulate these messages as follows. First, run Ft to generate
random values to serve as dummy protocol inputs. Then, according
to π , randomly enumerate several values from these dummy inputs
for generating candidate splits. Finally, based on the candidate
splits and dummy inputs, ξUD obtains a simulateWτ . Since the
feature data of each participant never leaves the local database
and Wτ is derived from a random range, AUD cannot identify
whetherWτ is dummy or not. Consequently, the simulatedWτ is
indistinguishable from a real split matrix. If chosen as the best split
provider by CS, ξUD asks Ft to encrypt the chosen candidate split
with HoEnc. According to Lemma 6.2, the output is indistinguishable
from an encrypted real value. In conclusion, such a ξUD described
in Theorem 6.4 exists. □
Theorem 6.5. For secure RF construction, there exists a PPT simu-
lator ξCS that can simulate an ideal view which is computationally
indistinguishable from the real view of ACS .
proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.4, for a corrupted CS,
ξCS simply runs it by using its local data. For an “honest” CS,
ξCS also uses the dummy values to simulate it for ACS . In this
stage, the message sent by CS is the sample selection vector ®µ, the
feature selection vector ®v and the command to ask for best split.
®v is randomly selected to select a subset of features for current
iteration of training. To operate the update of ®µ and simulate the
best split command, ξCS first asks Ft to randomly generate dummy
ground truths as protocol inputs. Then, based on the received split
vectors fromUD, ξCS asksFt to compute theMSE or Gini coefficient
with the dummy inputs and selects the best split vector. Since the
returned command for uploading encrypted best split does not
contain any special information, a simulated command or selection
vector ®v is indistinguishable from a real one. □
According to our security model, there are totally five attack
types for RevFRF, which are corrupted UD, corrupted CS, corrupted
CC, corrupted UD and CS or corrupted UD and CC. From the above
two theorems, it is natural to derive that under the five attacks,
there always exists a corresponding simulator whose ideal view is
indistinguishable from the real view of A. Therefore, we conclude
that the RF construction stage of RevFRF is secure in the honest-
but-curious model.
Secure RF Prediction. Since the security proof of RF Prediction is
similar to RF construction, we give the detailed proof in Appendix D.
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Secure Participant Revocation. For participant revocation, in
addition to avoid the private data of the revoked participant to be
revealed to the adversary, we also have to ensure that the revoked
data are unavailable for the remaining participants. Therefore, in the
subsequent security analysis, we first prove that the RFR-Revoc is
secure according to Definition 6.3. Then, we discuss how RFR-Revoc
implements the second security goal.
In RFR-Revoc, only CS and CC participate in the computations.
The following two theorems state that there exist two independent
simulators ξCS and ξCC that generate indistinguishable views for
π = {FRF-Revoc}.
Theorem 6.6. For secure participant revocation, there exists a PPT
simulator ξCS that can simulate an ideal view which is computation-
ally indistinguishable from the real view of ACS .
proof. For a corrupted CS, ξCS simply runs it with its local data.
For a “honest” CS, ξCS first runs the simulator of CS defined in
Theorem 6.5 to simulate the protocol inputs of FRF-Revoc, i.e., a
trained RF. Then, select the RDT nodes corresponding to the re-
voked participant from the simulated RF and send them to CC.
Finally, ask Ft to generate a random value and use it to refresh the
ciphertexts returned from CC. It can be found that the above ex-
changed messages only contain the encrypted splits of RDT nodes.
Based on Lemma 6.2, ACS cannot distinguish whether the cipher-
texts are simulated or not. Therefore, there exists a PPT simulator
ξCS that can simulate a view computationally indistinguishable
from the real view of ACS . □
Theorem 6.7. For secure participant revocation, there exists a PPT
simulator ξCC that can simulate an ideal view which is computation-
ally indistinguishable from the real view of ACC .
proof. During participant revocation, CC only takes on one task
which is refreshing the ciphertexts. Therefore, no matter CC is
“honest” or not, ξCC can simply simulate it by asking Ft to generate
a random value and operate HEncRef. Also, it is easy to derive that
the simulated view is indistinguishable from the real view of ACC .
□
FromTheorem 6.6 and Theorem 6.7, we prove that the participant
revocation of RevFRF does not leak any private data of the revoked
participant. Subsequently, we discuss that the revoked data are no
longer available for the adversary.
In Section 7.1.1, we define two levels of revocation. For the first-
level revocation, we suppose that the revoked participant cannot
be corrupted byA. For the second-level revocation,A is set to not
have such restriction. According to the design of RevFRF, the data
that a participant contributes to a learning federation in RevFRF
only contain the best split. While utilizing the encrypted best split,
CS has to operate HoLT and the result is encrypted with both the
CS public key and its provider’s public key. If a participant is re-
voked and not corrupted, the only way to utilize its data is breaking
the encryption algorithm HoEnc. However, based on Lemma 6.2,
HoEnc is unresolvable in polynomial time. Therefore, the first-level
revocation can achieve its security goal, i.e., “forward security”.
Additionally, to implement second-level revocation, we let CC and
CS refresh the splits of revoked RDT nodes, respectively. According
to our security model, CC and CS cannot be simultaneously cor-
rupted. Thus, the refreshed splits are not available evenA corrupts
the revoked participant, which proves that RevFRF achieves the
“backward” security in the second-level revocation.
7 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct experiments to prove the following three
aspects: The participant revocation does not obviously influence
RevFRF effectiveness (Section 7.1.1). RevFRF is as effective as the
other privacy-preserving RF frameworks (Section 7.1.2). RevFRF is
efficient for RF construction and prediction (Section 7.2).
Experiment Preparation.We use eight datasets from the UCI
machine learning repository [1] in our experiments, four for clas-
sification and four for regression, shown in Table 8. For DP-PKC,
we set N = 1024 to achieve 80-bits security level. The default maxi-
mum RDT number and tree depth are set to 100 and 10, respectively.
Our experiments are performed with two laptops, one with an Intel
Core i7-8565U CPU @1.8Ghz and 16G RAM and the other with an
Intel Core i5-7200 CPU @2.50GHz and 8GB RAM. The programs
are written in Java.
7.1 Effectiveness Evaluation
To assess the effectiveness of RevFRF, we first experiment with the
performance of RevFRF on eight datasets with different numbers of
revoked participants. Then, we compare the performance of RevFRF
with other privacy-preserving RF frameworks.
7.1.1 Effectiveness Evaluation with Participant Revocation. The ex-
periment results are presented in Table 2 and Table 3. For classifica-
tion, we evaluate the impact of participant revocation on accuracy
(ACC), recall rate (RR) and F1-score (F1). For regression, we evaluate
the impact of participant revocation on mean square error (MSE),
mean absolute error (MAE) and R-Square (R2). The six indicators
are commonly used to assess the performance of a machine learning
model [25, 36]. Specially, we still suppose that each participant only
owns one dimension of data, i.e. one feature.
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Figure 7: Classification Performance Evaluation (ACC)
From the experiment results, the increase of revoked participants
has little impact on the performance of RevFRFwhen the percentage
of revoked participants is less than 50%. Specifically, with maximum
five revoked participants, the classification accuracy loss is less than
5%, and the increased prediction error for regression is less than
3%. Therefore, in most cases, the revocation of parts of participants
in RevFRF hardly influences the effectiveness of RevFRF. Table 2
and Table 3 show that RevFRF has a very small computation error
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Figure 8: Regression Performance Evaluation (MSE)
compared to the original RF (Non.Fed). The error is mainly caused
by two aspects. First, the computations of RF involve some random
operations, which may lead to the uncontrollable differences in
trained models. Second, the data in parts of the datasets are stored
in floating-point format. As mentioned in Section 4, we use the
fixed-point format to represent these data to guarantee the security
of HE. Sometimes, the format transformation causes precision loss.
Fig. 7 and Fig. 9 further show the training process of the original
RF framework (Non.Fed) and RevFRF. With the increased RDT
number, RevFRF attains approximate performancewith the Non.Fed
framework on two most important indicators for classification and
regression, ACC and MSE.
7.1.2 Effectiveness Comparison. Furthermore, we compare our per-
formance against the protocols in [23, 29] on four datasets. [23] and
[29] are two of the most influential works on both secure RF con-
struction and prediction. Regard the original RF as the benchmark.
Our results illustrated in Table 4 show that the introduction of noise
in the DP based framework [23] causes more obvious performance
loss than RevFRF with 100 RDTs. Both [29] and RevFRF can achieve
similar performance to the original RF. Nevertheless, RevFRF is
designed to be more adaptive to handle the participant revocation
condition, and require less overhead for RF construction (discussed
in Section 7.2).
7.2 Efficiency Evaluation
To assess the efficiency of RevFRF, we first theoretically analyse
the computation and communication cost of RevFRF. Then, we
compare the cost of RevFRF with the existing frameworks. Finally,
we show the detailed cost analysis of secure RF construction and
prediction stages, respectively.
7.2.1 Theoretical Analysis. The theoretical computation and com-
munication cost of RevFRF are given below. Here, O(·) is used to
express the upper bound of computation and communication cost.
Computation Cost. Assume a regular exponentiation operation
requires 1.5N multiplications [14]. N is the data length of the ex-
ponent. Since the cost of an exponentiation operation is much more
than an addition or multiplication operation, the fixed numbers of
addition and multiplication operations are ignored in our analysis.
Thus, we can conclude that HoEnc requires 3N to encrypt a message.
HEncRef needs 1.5N multiplications. ParHDec1 and ParHDec2 totally
need 3N multiplications. HoLT requires 39N multiplications.
Represent the maximum tree number, the maximum tree depth,
the randomly selected feature number and the candidate splits pro-
vided by a participant as tmax , dmax , nf and ϱ respectively. In
secure RF construction, RevFRF generates O(tmax · 2dmax ) RDT
nodes. For each node, CS computes nf MSE or Gini functions. The
selected normal participant conducts one HoEnc. Thus, the computa-
tion cost of CS in this stage is O(tmax ·2dmax ·nf ·ϱ)multiplications.
The normal participant takes 4.5N ·O(tmax ·2dmax )multiplications.
In secure RF prediction, RevFRF computes O(tmax · dmax ) RDT
nodes. For each node, CS conducts one HoLT and one ParHDec2. The
selected normal participant conducts one ParHDec1. Therefore, CS
requires 42N · O(tmax · dmax ) multiplications. And the normal
participant computes up to 4.5N · O(tmax · dmax ) multiplications.
For the worst case of participant revocation, the computation
cost is the same as RF construction. However, the expected cost of
RF rebuilding in participant revocation is much less than RF con-
struction. Suppose the probability for an RDT node to be revoked
in an RDT is identical and the number of revoked participants is
nd . The expected number of revoked RDT nodes for an RDT is
nd
2dmax
∑dmax−1
i=0 2
dmax−i · 2i = dmax · nd . Thus, for the first-level
revocation, the expected computation costs of CS and normal par-
ticipant are dmax · nd · nf · ϱ and 4.5N · dmax · nd , respectively.
For the second-level revocation, the expected computation cost CS
is 3N · dmax · nd · nf · ϱ, and the cost of normal participant is the
same as the first-level revocation.
Communication Cost. Assume that the output of HoEnc is 4N
bits and the number of total samples are nt . Similarly, we derive
the communication cost as follows.
In secure RF construction, RevFRF costs (4N+nf ·nt ·ϱ)·O(tmax ·
2dmax ) bits. In secure RF prediction, RevFRF costs 28N · O(tmax ·
dmax ) bits. Similar to computation cost, we give the expected com-
munication cost of participant revocation. For the first-level revo-
cation, RevFRF costs (4N + nf · nt · ϱ) · dmax · nd bits. For the
second-level revocation, RevFRF costs (8N +nf ·nt · ϱ) ·dmax ·nd
bits.
7.2.2 Cost Comparison. We compare the RevFRF efficiency against
the protocols in [5, 29, 32]. [23] is ignored because of its perfor-
mance loss. Specially, [5] and [32] are designed for RF prediction
and cannot be used for RF construction. [29] does not have a CS.
For tree construction, we calculate the computation and commu-
nication cost of generating 100 RDT nodes with 5000 samples of
the Adult Income dataset. For tree prediction, the computation and
communication cost is evaluated with ten trees whose depth is ten.
The results reported in the experiments are an average over 10 tri-
als. Table 6 illustrates the comparison results. Compared to [5] and
[32], RevFRF outperforms them in terms of computation and com-
munication cost. Although [23] costs less in the prediction stage,
RevFRF is over 2000 times faster than it in the tree construction
stage. The reason is that [23] needs to encrypt the whole dataset for
secure RF construct with a HE algorithm, which is not very practi-
cal in real-world applications. On the contrary, we minimize the
HE usage (once per RDT node) by virtue of federated learning. The
experiment results also obey the comparison result of theoretical
computation cost, shown in Table 5.
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Table 2: Classification with Different Numbers of Revoked Participant
Revoked Participants Adult Income Bank Market Drug Consumption Wine QualityNon.Fed RevFRF Non.Fed RevFRF Non.Fed RevFRF Non.Fed RevFRF
0
ACC 85.63 85.63 90.97 90.77 90.62 90.53 68.52 68.51
RR 86.17 86.15 91.69 91.46 91.27 91.18 66.27 66.17
F1 85.69 85.72 91.19 91.01 90.55 90.59 64.64 64.37
1
ACC 85.37 85.28 90.32 90.83 90.49 90.62 67.69 67.43
RR 85.91 85.81 91.27 91.47 91.17 91.27 65.71 65.45
F1 85.45 85.39 90.55 91.06 90.48 90.66 64.17 64.23
2
ACC 85.11 84.43 90.38 90.49 90.28 90.44 67.41 67.38
RR 85.61 85.02 91.29 91.23 90.97 91.09 65.66 64.68
F1 85.2 84.56 90.61 90.73 90.29 90.52 64.2 63.51
3
ACC 84.42 83.91 90.34 89.84 90.14 90.62 66.05 65.16
RR 85.03 84.52 91.19 90.83 90.87 91.25 65.08 64.33
F1 84.54 84.04 90.62 90.12 90.17 90.67 63.57 63.04
4
ACC 83.53 83.41 90.26 90.16 90.11 90.33 65.52 65.33
RR 84.19 84.06 91.17 91.01 90.87 90.89 63.83 63.66
F1 83.67 83.54 90.51 90.43 90.09 90.44 62.35 62.44
5
ACC 83.15 83.44 90.17 90.61 90.09 89.97 64.49 64.49
RR 83.87 84.09 91.1 91.27 90.86 90.74 63.31 62.41
F1 83.31 83.59 90.42 90.86 90.07 90.02 61.88 61.19
Table 3: Regression with Different Numbers of Revoked Participant
Revoked Participant Super Conduct Appliance Energy Insurance Company News PopularityNon.Fed RevFRF Non.Fed RevFRF Non.Fed RevFRF Non.Fed RevFRF
0
MSE 994.69 1005.21 6038.64 6058.42 0.065 0.065 1414.85 1433.06
MAE 27.01 27.05 36.37 36.49 0.11 0.11 4.404 4.48
R2 0.22 0.23 0.46 0.46 0.098 0.099 0.23 0.25
1
MSE 995.24 1009.98 6052.24 6057.77 0.065 0.65 1424.79 1442.01
MAE 26.97 27.07 36.46 36.52 0.11 0.11 4.471 4.49
R2 0.22 0.23 0.46 0.46 0.098 0.097 0.239 0.25
2
MSE 1000.7 1012.98 6063.66 6067.67 0.065 0.065 1423.34 1439.91
MAE 27.04 27.13 36.62 36.57 0.11 0.11 4.47 4.476
R2 0.22 0.24 0.46 0.46 0.098 0.098 0.24 0.25
3
MSE 1010.79 1018.59 6078.93 6081.46 0.065 0.065 1430.98 1443.31
MAE 27.14 27.27 36.59 36.61 0.11 0.11 4.498 44.89
R2 0.24 0.25 0.46 0.46 0.099 0.099 0.244 0.26
4
MSE 1012.88 1021.33 6090.12 6112.55 0.065 0.065 1441.42 1449.98
MAE 27.24 27.38 36.73 37.39 0.11 0.11 4.506 44.93
R2 0.24 0.25 0.46 0.46 0.099 0.099 0.253 0.26
5
MSE 1021.2 1029.26 6135.74 6178.1 0.065 0.065 1445.43 1456.81
MAE 27.33 27.43 36.735 37.01 0.11 0.11 4.488 4.51
R2 0.25 0.26 0.45 0.45 0.099 0.099 0.256 0.27
Table 4: Performance Comparison
Non.Fed [23] [29] RevFRF
Cla. Adult 85.63 78.87 85.25 85.26Bank 90.97 86.55 90.5 90.77
Reg. Conduct 27.01 35.75 27.17 27.05Bike 11.52 20.23 11.6 11.55
Cla.→ Classification task evaluated with accuracy;
Reg.→ Regression task evaluated with mean square error.
Furthermore, Table 7 illustrates the time required for RF rebuild-
ing. In the experiment, we conduct RevFRF with different numbers
of revoked participants and RevFRF without the participant revoca-
tion mechanism (i.e., Irev.Fed), which needs to rebuild the whole
RF. From the experiment result, we can derive that the computation
cost for an irrevocable RF framework is greatly higher than RevFRF.
And with more participants revoked from the learning federation,
the time required for RevFRF to rebuild a federation also increases.
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Table 5: Comparison of Theoretical Computation Cost
Center Server Normal Participant
Our Comp.
TC O(tmax · 2dmax · nf · ϱ) 4.5N · O(tmax · 2dmax )
TP 42N · O(tmax · dmax ) 4.5N · O(tmax · dmax )
PR 3N · dmax · nd · nf · ϱ 4.5N · dmax · nd
[29] Comp. TC N.A. 1.5N · O(tmax · 2
dmax · nt )
TP N.A. 1.5N · O(tmax · dmax )
[5] Comp. TP 7.5N · O(tmax · dmax · N) + 1.5N · O(tmax · dmax ) 4.5N · O(tmax · dmax · N) + 3N · O(tmax · dmax )
[32] Comp. TP 6N · O(tmax · dmax · N) 3N · O(tmax · dmax · N)
Comp.→ Computation Cost; Comm.→ Communication Cost; TC→ Tree Construction; TP→ Tree Prediction nt ≫ nf .
Table 6: Efficiency Comparison
Computation (s) Communication (MB)
TC TP TC TP
[5] CS N.A. 28.56 N.A. 81.58UD N.A. 57.15
[32] CS N.A. 26.32 N.A. 9.71UD N.A. 57.15
[29] UD 3932.41 0.55 0.42 0.41
RevFRF CS 3.09 13.33 1.07 0.78UD 2.27. 0.08
Table 7: Rebuilding Time with Different Numbers of Re-
voked Participants
Revoked Partic-
ipant
1 2 3 4 5 IRev.Fed
Revoked RDT
Nodes
16.1 37 50.1 83.1 136.3 432.5
Rebuilding
Time
1.2 2.7 3.6 6.1 9.8 31.1
IRev.Fed← The irrevocable federated RF framework
7.2.3 Efficiency Evaluation of RevFRF. Fig. 9(a) and Fig. 9(b) further
show the overhead of secure RF construction and prediction under
different numbers of RDT nodes and tree depth. When the gener-
ated RDT nodes increase in the tree construction stage, both the
computation cost and the communication cost of RevFRF linearly
grow. Alongwith the increase of tree depth, the cost growth trend of
tree prediction is analogous to tree construction, i.e. linear growth.
The experimental results accord with the theoretical analysis.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the revocable federated learning con-
cept and proposed a revocable federated RF framework, RevFRF.
In RevFRF, we presented a suite of HE based secure protocols to
achieve privacy-preserving RF construction and prediction. Based
on the specially designed RDT node storage method, RevFRF also
supported secure participant revocation. Moreover, we gave a com-
prehensive analysis to show that RevFRF could resolve all the secu-
rity problems for a revocable federated learning framework. The
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Figure 9: Computation and communication cost of RevFRF
results of extensive experiments proved that compared to the exist-
ing privacy-preserving RF frameworks, our federated framework
had lower performance loss and higher efficiency.
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A HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
Here, we give more detailed definition abouts the fixed-point data
format and the HE functions.
A.1 Fixed-Point Data Format
In RevFRF, we use the fixed-point format [18] to represent the
input and output of HE functions. In this format, we represent an
arbitrary number x ∈ R to be xˆ = ⌊x · 10c ⌋ mod N , where ⌊·⌋
is a function to round a number to its nearest integer, c is a fixed
integer used to control representation precision. For example, given
x = 3.1415, c = 2 and N = 13, x is represented as xˆ = ⌊3.1415 · 102⌋
mod 13 = 314 mod 13. This data representation method can cause
a little precision loss of precision but is essential to ensure the
security of the HE functions.
A.2 Homomorphic Encryption Functions
The detailed definitions of the HE functions are given as follows.
Encryption (HoEnc). To encrypt a plaintext messagem ∈ ZN ,
the encipherer u first selects a random number r ∈ [1,N /4]. Then,
computeC1 = pkru (1+mN ) = дsku ·r (1+mN ) mod N 2 andC2 = дr
mod N 2. The final output of HoEnc is [[m]]pku = {C1,C2}.
Re-Encryption (HReEnc). To re-encrypt a ciphertext [[m]]pku ,
CS first computes h2 = CskCS2 = д
r ·skCS mod N 2. Then, CS up-
dates C ′1 = C1 · h2 = д(sku+skCS )r (1 +mN ) mod N 2. The final
output of HReEnc is [[m]]pkΣ = {C ′1,C ′2}.
CiphertextRefresh (HEncRef).To refresh a ciphertext [[m]]pku ,
CS or CC first generates a random value rp , and then, compute:
C ′1 = C1 ·C
rp
2 = д
(sku+rp )r (1 +mN ) mod N 2.
The final output of HEncRef is [[m]]new = {C ′1,C2}.
Partial Decryption (ParHDec1 and ParHDec2). To decrypt a
cihpertext [[m]]pkΣ , pkΣ = pkCS + pku , we have to operate both
ParHDec1 and ParHDec2. Suppose the decrypter is CS. For ParHDec1,
CS asks u to update C ′1 = C1/Csku2 = дskCS ·r (1 +mN ) mod N 2.
The output of ParHDec1, [[m]]pkCS = {C ′1,C2}, is returned to CS.
For ParHDec2, CS computesm = L(C ′1/CskCS2 mod N 2) mod N ,
where L(x) = (x − 1)/N . The final output of ParHDec2 ism.
To implement HoLT, we still have to introduce a HE addition
function (HoAdd).
Addition across Different Domains(HoAdd). Given two ci-
phertext [[m1]]pku1 and [[m2]]pku2 , HoAdd outputs the encrypted
addition result [[m1 +m2]]pkΣ . HoAdd can only be conducted by CS.
To achieve this, CS first selects two random numbers, α1,α2 ∈ ZN ,
and computes:
[[m1 + α1]]pku1 = [[m1]]pku1 · [[α1]]pku1 = {C
′
1,C
′
2},
[[m2 + α2]]pku2 = [[m2]]pku2 · [[α2]]pku2 = {C
′′
1 ,C
′
2}.
Then, CS uses its strong private key λ1 to partially decrypt:
P1′ = C ′λ11 = д
r1 ·sku1 ·λ1 (1 + (m1 + α1)Nλ1) mod N 2,
P1′′ = C ′′λ11 = д
r2 ·sku2 ·λ1 (1 + (m2 + α2)Nλ1) mod N 2.
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C ′1, C
′′
1 , P1
′ and P1′′ are sent to CC. Next, CC also uses its own
strong private key λ2 to partially decrypt the cipertexts:
P2′ = C ′λ21 = д
r1 ·sku1 ·λ2 (1 + (m1 + α1)Nλ2) mod N 2,
P2′′ = C ′′λ21 = д
r2 ·sku2 ·λ2 (1 + (m2 + α2)Nλ2) mod N 2.
CC can subsequently obtain the addition result that are masked
with two random values by calculating:
m1 +m2 + α1 + α2 = L(P1′ · P2′) + L(P1′′ · P2′′) mod N ,
P1′ · P2′ = дr1 ·sku1 ·λ(1 + (m1 + α1)Nλ)
= 1 + (m1 + α1)Nλ mod N 2,
P1′′ · P2′′ = дr2 ·sku2 ·λ(1 + (m2 + α2)Nλ)
= 1 + (m2 + α2)Nλ mod N 2.
Express the masked addition result asM =m1 +m2 + α1 + α2. CC
encrypts [[M]]pkΣ = HoEnc(pku1 + pku2 ,M) with the public keys of
u1 and u2 and returns [[M]]pkΣ to CS. As received the encrypted
result, CS can compute the final output [[m1 +m2]]pkΣ = [[M]]pkΣ ·
([[α1 + α2]]pkΣ )N−1.
Secure Comparison (HoLT). Given two ciphertext [[m1]]pku1
and [[m2]]pku2 ,HoLT is used to judge their relationship, i.e.,m1 < m2
orm1 ,m2. To achieve this goal, CS first computes [[2m1+1]]pku1 =
[[m1]]2pku1 ·[[m1]]pku1 ·[[1]]pku1 and [[2m2]]pku2 = [[m2]]
2
pku2
·[[m2]]pku2 .
Then, CS randomly selects a number α from {0, 1}. If α = 1, CS
calculates [[β]]pkΣ =HoAdd([[2m1 + 1]]pku1 , ([[2m2]]pku2 )N−1); oth-
erwise, [[β]]pkΣ =HoAdd([[2m2]]pku2 , ([[2m1 + 1]]pku1 )N−1). CS se-
lects a random number r satisfying | |r | | < | |N | |/4 and computes
[[β ′]]pkΣ = ([[β]]pkΣ )r . Next, CS and CC decrypt the [[β ′]]pkΣ with
their strong private keys λ1 and λ2 in the same way as HoAdd. If
the decryption result | |β ′ | | > | |N | |/2, CC denotes l = 1; other-
wise, l = 0. Subsequently, CC sends [[l]]pkΣ′ =HoEnc(pkCS +pku2 , l)
to CS, where pkΣ′ = pkCS · pku2 . Specially, CS needs to update
[[l]]pkΣ′ = [[1]]pkΣ′ · ([[l]]pkΣ′ )N−1 if α = 0. Finally, CS obtains the
comparison result l by operating ParHDec1 and ParHDec2. If l = 1,
m1 is less thanm2; otherwise,m1 ≥ m2.
B QUALITY ASSESSMENT FUNCTIONS
For regression, CS computes the addition of mean squared errors
for two child nodes.
E(D1,D2, ®w) = 1
n1
∑
yi ∈D1
(yi − y¯D1 )2 +
1
n2
∑
yi ∈D2
(yi − y¯D2 )2, (2)
where D1 and D2 are the samples of two child nodes obtained by
the split vector ®w ; n1 and n2 are the numbers of samples in D1
and D2; yi is the ground-truth with index i; y¯D1 and y¯D2 are the
average values of the ground-truth in D1 and D2, respectively. For
classification, CS computes the Gini coefficients.
G(D1,D2, ®w) = (1 −
n1∑
xi ∈D1
k∑
j=1
pxi , j ) + (1 −
n2∑
xi ∈D2
k∑
j=1
pxi , j ). (3)
k is the number of classes. pxi , j is the probability of sample xi to
be classified into the class j.
C FEDERATED RF PREDICTION PROTOCOLS
The two types of RF prediction mentioned in Section 5.3 are pre-
sented in Protocol 4, 5, 6 and 7, respectively.
Protocol 4 Federated RF Prediction (FRF-Predict)
Input: A random forest T ; a prediction request ®x =
{x1,x2, ...,xγ }, γ = |F |;
Output: The prediction result O .
1: The requestor u0 encrypts [[®x]]pk0 = ([[x1]]pk0 , [[x2]]pk0 , ...,
[[xγ ]]pk0 ) =HoEnc(pk0, ®x) and uploads it to CS.
2: for Ti ∈ T do
3: CS computes ri =FT-Predict(Ti , 1, [[®x]]pk0 ) andR = R∪ri
4: end for
5: if task is 0 then # regression task
6: CS computes the final output O = 1|R |
∑ |R |
i=1 ri
7: else # classification task
8: CS counts ri ∈ R, and selects the one with most votes as
the final classification result O .
9: end if
10: CS returns O to u0.
Protocol 5 Federated Tree Prediction (FT-Predict)
Input: A tree node Node; current tree depth dc ; an encrypted
prediction request [[®x]]pk0 = ([[x1]]pk0 , [[x2]]pk0 , ..., [[xγ ]]pk0 ).
Output: The prediction result of a tree r .
1: if dc ≥ dmax then
2: return the weight of Node .
3: end if
4: CS extracts the split [[sτ ]]pkτ and the correspond-
ing split provider uτ from Node and computes
[[l]]pkΣ =HoLT([[xτ ]]pk0 , [[sτ ]]pkτ ), where pkΣ = pkCS + pkτ .
5: CS forwards the requestor ID and the half-decrypted ciphertext,
u0, [[l]]pkΣ .
6: uτ returns [[l]]pkCS =ParHDec1(skτ , [[l]]pkΣ ) if he accepts the
requestor.
7: CS decrypts l =ParHDec2(skCS , [[l]]pkCS ) and updates
dc = dc + 1. If l is 0, operate FT-Predict(Node →
riдhtChild,dc , [[®x]]pk0 ); otherwise, FT-Predict(Node →
le f tChild,dc , [[®x]]pk0 ).
D SECURITY OF SECURE RF PREDICTION
The security of secure RF prediction in a similar way to secure RF
construction.
Theorem D.1. For secure RF prediction, there exists a PPT simula-
tor ξUD that can simulate an ideal view, which is computationally
indistinguishable from the real view of AUD .
proof. Two kinds of participants in UD have to be simulated in
this stage, the prediction requester and the normal participants.
For corrupted participants, ξUD can still use their local data to
complete the protocol steps. For an honest prediction requester,
ξUD simulates it by using a randomly generated dummy request
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Protocol 6 Federated RF Prediction for Testing Data (FRF-Test)
Input: A random forest T ; the index of testing sample index ;
Output: The testing result O .
1: for Ti ∈ RF do
2: CS computes ri =FT-Testing(Ti , 1, index) and R = R ∪ ri
3: end for
4: if task is 0 then # regression task
5: CS computes the final output O = 1|R |
∑ |R |
i=1 ri
6: else # classification task
7: CS counts ri ∈ R, and selects the one with most votes as
the final classification result O .
8: end if
9: CS returns O to u0.
Protocol 7 Federated Tree Prediction for Testing Data (FT-Test)
Input: A tree node Node; the index of testing sample index ; cur-
rent tree depth dc ;
Output: The prediction result of a tree r .
1: if dc ≥ dmax then
2: return the weight of Node .
3: end if
4: CS extracts the split [[sτ ]]pkτ and corresponding split provider
uτ of current node of Ti .
5: CS re-encrypts the split [[sτ ]]pkΣ =HReEnc(pkCS , [[sτ ]]pkτ ) and
sends [[sτ ]]pkΣ to uτ .
6: uτ computes [[sτ ]]pkCS =ParHDec1(skτ , [[sτ ]]pkΣ ), encrypts the
local feature value [[xindex ]]pkτ =HoEnc(pkτ ,xindex ) and in-
vokes [[l]]pkΣ =HoLT([[xτ ]]τ , [[sτ ]]pkCS ).
7: uτ returns [[l]]pkCS =ParHDec1(skτ , [[l]]pkΣ ).
8: CS decrypts l =ParHDec2(skCS , [[l]]pkCS ) and updatesdc = dc +
1. If l is 0, operate FT-Test(Node → riдhtChild,dc , [[®x]]pk0 );
otherwise, FT-Test(Node → le f tChild,dc , [[®x]]pk0 ).
and encrypting the request with HoEnc. Base on Lemma 6.2, the
ideal encrypted request is computationally indistinguishable from
a real one. For an honest normal participant, it only has to return
a partially decrypted result to CS. This can be simply simulated
by asking Ft to operate ParHDec1, whose security is proved in
Lemma 6.2, and returns the output to AUD . In consequence, it is
concluded that the simulated view is indistinguishable from the
real view of AUD . □
Theorem D.2. For secure RF prediction, there exists a PPT simu-
lator ξCS that can simulate an ideal view, which is computationally
indistinguishable from the real view of ACS .
proof. ξCS can simulate the prediction stage in two steps. First,
ξCS combines the simulator in Theorem 6.5 to get the input of HoLT,
i.e., the encrypted split. Second, ξCS completes the iterative invo-
cation of FT-Predict by running ParHDec2 and outputs the final
result. The homomorphic encryption keys in this stage are the same
as Theorem 6.5. From Lemma 6.2, the two functions can be securely
conducted. Therefore, the simulated view is indistinguishable from
the real view of ACS . □
Theorem D.3. For secure RF prediction, there exists a PPT simu-
lator ξCC that can simulate an ideal view, which is computationally
indistinguishable from the real view of ACC .
proof. In RevFRF, the only task of CC is to assist CS to complete
the computation of some homomorphic encryption based functions
(referring to Appendix A.2). Therefore, the security proof of CC is
totally based on Lemma 6.2. Since Lemma 6.2 has been proved to
be secure [6], there must be a simulator that can perfectly simulate
ξCC . The interested readers can refer to [16] for detailed proof. □
Based on the above theorems, we can simply derive that the
RF prediction stage of RevFRF is secure with different kinds of
adversaries defined in our security model.
E EXPERIMENTS OF REVFRF
E.1 Dataset Information
Table 8 shows the datasets used in our experiments.
Table 8: Dataset Information
Name No. of In-
stances
No. of
Features
Task Type
Adult Income 48842 14 Cla.
Bank Market 45211 17 Cla.
Drug Consumption 1885 32 Cla.
Wine Quality 4898 12 Cla.
Super Conduct 21263 81 Reg.
Appliance Energy 19735 29 Reg.
Insurance Company 9000 86 Reg.
News Popularity 39797 61 Reg.
E.2 Evaluation Indicators
The computations of the six indicators are listed as follows.
ACC =
TP +TN
TP +TN + FP + FN
,
RR =
TP
TP + FN
, F1 = 2TP2TP + FP + FN ,
where TP , FP , TN , FN are the numbers of true positive, false posi-
tive, true negative and false negative samples, respectively [33].
MSE =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − yˆi )2,MAE = 1
n
n∑
i=1
|yi − yi |,
R2 = 1 −
n∑
i=1
(yi − yˆi )2/
n∑
i=1
(y¯i − yˆi )2,
where n is the number of validation samples, yi is the ground truth,
yˆi is the prediction result and y¯ is the average of predicted results.
